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This paper presents a novel approach for augmenting proof-based verification with performance-style
analysis of the kind employed in state-of-the-art model checking tools for probabilistic systems.
Quantitative safety properties usually specified as probabilistic system invariants and modeled in
proof-based environments are evaluated using bounded model checking techniques [4].
Our specific contributions include the statement of a theorem that is central to model checking
safety properties of proof-based systems, the establishment of a procedure; and its full implemen-
tation in a prototype system (YAGA) which readily transforms a probabilistic model specified in a
proof-based environment to its equivalent verifiable PRISM [10] model equipped with reward struc-
tures [1]. The reward structures capture the exact interpretation of the probabilistic invariants and can
reveal succinct information about the model during experimental investigations. Finally, we demon-
strate the novelty of the technique on a probabilistic library case study.
1 Introduction
There are two main techniques for investigating quantitative properties of probabilistic systems be-
haviours:
Probabilistic model checking comprises the formalisation of a model (which describes a system op-
erationally), and a suite of algorithms to analyse various correctness and performance properties (usually
expressed as a probabilistic temporal logic) of the model.
Proof-based verification on the other hand are practical applications of deductive proof methods to
establish a link between the operational description of the model and the desired properties.
Over the years these two techniques have developed almost independently. The goal of this paper is
to establish a formal link between them in a way that has never been previously explored. Our intention is
to make such linkage beneficial to practitioners of both techniques, and hence ensure future applicability
of the proposed practice especially on an industrial scale.
The B-Method [3] is an industrial-strength specification language for describing large-scale abstract
system behaviours. The method’s development process ensures that specifications gradually evolve via
refinement to implementable code. The probabilistic B (pB) [7] extends the B-Method to incorporate
probability.
PRISM [10] is a probabilistic model checker which accepts probabilistic models described in its
modeling language — a simple state-based language. Three types of probabilistic models are supported
directly — Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs), Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), and Continu-
ous Time Markov Chains (CTMCs). This work is based on the the MDP type of the language.
∗The author is a recipient of the Australian Commonwealth Endeavour International Postgraduate Research Scholarship
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One of the key features of the pB language is the statement of invariants — they provide a means of
describing properties required to maintain the integrity of a system under construction. In an attempt to
establish a generalised view of probabilistic system invariant properties, Hoang T.S. et al. [14] originally
explored the use of “expectations” as system invariants in proof-based systems. Including probabilistic
invariants in systems design is a useful means of enforcing quantitative safety properties — for example,
tolerance for expected error in a probabilistic system behaviour.
Discharging a pB machine’s safety proof obligation involves the verification (by a human or auto-
mated support) that indeed the expectation holds for all executions of the machine; but sometimes the
prover fails to establish this goal. It is pertinent to mention that not all the undischargeable proof obliga-
tions are malignant to the overall performance outlook of the final machine for deployment. However, in
safety-critical systems development, this assumption cannot be taken lightly hence the need to explore
other techniques of gaining intuition into the failure of the provers to discharge their proof obligations.
For standard (non-probabilistic) B machines, a prototype system [15] which incorporates a model
checking tool has been used to detect various errors in simple machine specifications. However, for the
probabilistic counterparts, we show how to link the model checking facility of PRISM with abstract
systems specified in pB via the latter’s probabilistic invariants. The importance of such a link is to enable
pB designers explore their models experimentally; such an exploration is likely to reveal undesirable
performance attributes of their models, and in particular guide them with a decision in the event that the
invariants fail to hold.
Our technique is as follows. Given a proof-based machine specified in pB, we generate its equivalent
probabilistic action systems representation (in the PRISM language) fully augmented with reward struc-
tures [1] inherited from the pB machine’s expectations, and either confirm (or refute) the statement over
the expectations. In the event that the statement fails to hold, we get an intuition of the possible cause(s)
of failure. Our specific contributions are as follows:
(a) The statement of a theorem that forms the implicit link between a pB invariant and its reward-
based model checking equivalent.
(b) A procedure for transforming a pB machine specified in a proof-based environment to its equiva-
lent PRISM representation.
(c) A prototype system to automate the procedure. In addition, we equip the resultant PRISM model
with reward structures inherited from the pB machine’s expectations, to allow for experiments.
(d) A demonstration of the novelty of our technique on a small case study of a probabilistic library
system.
Overall, this paper is structured as follows. We introduce the pGSL and its expectations in sec. 2, and set
the theoretical foundation of our procedure in secs. 3, and 4. The automation of that procedure is in sec.
5. A practical demonstration of our technique is in secs. 6 and 7. Finally, we conclude in sec. 8.
2 Probabilistic Generalised Substitution Language pGSL
Abrial’s Generalised Substitution Language GSL [3] is based on Dijkstra’s weakest-precondition wp
semantics of describing computations and their meaning [5]. The semantics, expressive in the B-Method
(B) [3], defines the concept of an “abstract machine”. The Abstract Machine Notation (AMN) explores
B’s capabilities via refinement for incrementing designs such that relevant system properties are always
preserved. The complete framework supports the development of provably correct systems.
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command command transformer semantics
name (comm) (wp.comm.E)
identity skip E
assignment x := f E[x := f ]
composition r;r′ wp.r.(wp.r′ .E)
choice r ⊳ G ⊲ r′ wp.r.E ⊳ G ⊲ wp.r′ .E
probability r p⊕ r
′
wp.r.E p⊕ wp.r
′
.E
nondeterminism r ⊓ r′ wp.r.E min wp.r′ .E
strong iteration do G→ r od µX • (wp.r.X ⊳ G ⊲ E)
weak iteration It r tI νX • (wp.r.X min E)
Figure 1: Structural definition of the expectation transformer-style semantics.
The logic pGSL [11] is a smooth extension of the GSL, in which the standard boolean values —
representing certainty are replaced by real-values — representing probability. Its logical framework is the
probabilistic Abstract Machine Notation (pAMN) [7], an extension of the standard AMN. Its specification
is based on the probabilistic B (pB). The syntactic structure of the pGSL is rich enough to permit the
specification of abstract probabilistic system behaviours. Details of the GSL can be found in [3], while
that of its theoretical and practical extensions are in [11] and [14, 7] respectively.
An important component of the pGSL is the specification of probabilistic invariants to ensure con-
sistency between system designs. This is indeed crucial since it also assures that undesirable operation
sequences do not lead to a violation of the critical properties of a system. In fact, the semantics of the
pGSL which is based on the expectation transformer-style semantics of pGCL [9] (shown in Fig. 1) gives
a complete characterisation of probabilistic programs with nondeterminism, and they are sufficient to ex-
press many performance-style properties. To further explore this capability, we set out the definitions
below. Their elementary details can be found elsewhere [13, 16].
Definition 1: (Sub-distribution) For any finite state space S, the set of sub-distributions over S is
S , {∆ : S → [0,1] | ∑∆≤ 1} , (1)
the set of functions from S into the closed interval of reals [0, 1] that sum to no more than one 1.
Definition 2: (Labeled Markov Decision Process) A tuple (S, sˆ, A, L), where S is as defined above, sˆ ∈ S
is the initial state, A : S→ 2S is a transition function, and L : S→ 2AP is a labeling function which assigns
to each state, a subset of the set of atomic propositions AP that are valid for that state.
Definition 3: (Path) A path in an MDP is a non-empty finite or infinite sequence of states s0 α0−→ s1 α1−→
... where αi ∈ A(si) and αi(si+1)> 0 for all si ∈ S.
Definition 4: (Absorbing state) A state si ∈ S is said to be absorbing if no transition leaves this state
after resolving all the nondeterministic selections in the state i.e., si αi=1−→ si, and si αi=0−→ s j whenever i 6= j.
A probabilistic computation tree formalises the notion of a probabilistic distribution over execution
traces required to give semantic interpretation to temporal properties. Each step on a path will have an
associated probability (often probability one for standard steps in the computation) — and the probabil-
ities on those individual steps when multiplied together, determine probability for paths ending up in a
particular absorbing state. Our interest lies in only using such probabilities masses for finite paths.
1Probabilities that sum to less than one represent aborting behaviours. We do not discuss such program behaviours here.
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Definition 5: (Endpoint of a distribution) Any absorbing state s over the distribution ∆ is said to be at
the endpoint of the distribution.
Definition 6: (Random variable) A random variable is a non-negative real-valued function over the state
space in which our programs operate.
Definition 7: (Expected value) For any bounded random variable α in S → R≥ and distribution ∆ ∈ S,
the expected value of α over ∆ is defined
∫
∆
α , ∑(α .s∗∆.s) , (2)
for any state s in the endpoint of the distribution ∆.
2.1 The PCHOICE Operator
In [14] Hoang T.S. et al. introduced a PCHOICE operator in the standard AMN’s operations — sim-
ilar to the probabilistic choice operator of Fig. 1, which also permits the specification of probabilistic
behaviours in a typical machine. This extension, captured in the the probabilistic Abstract Machine No-
tation (pAMN), and expressed in the pB method, describes probabilistic machines with an additional
EXPECTATIONS clause2. Ideally, probabilistic invariant properties are then defined as random vari-
ables over the machine’s state, and encoded in the EXPECTATIONS clause. An invariant of this form is
then an “expected value-invariant”. Later on, we show how the pAMN can be used to specify abstract
probabilistic system behaviours. A comprehensive list of the pAMN clauses can be found in [7].
2.2 The EXPECTATIONS clause
It gives a random variable ξ over the program state, denoting the expected value-invariant, and an initial
expression e which is evaluated over the program variables when the machine is initialised. The idea
is that after arbitrary executions of the program, the expected value of ξ at any given program state, is
always at least the value of e initially [14].
More formally, suppose a probabilistic machine has initialisation INIT and two operations OpX
and OpY respectively, therefore, satisfying the probabilistic proof obligation for some expected value-
invariant ξ and initial expression e would operationally (Fig. 1) imply that3
ξ ⇛ wp.OpX .ξ and ξ ⇛ wp.OpY .ξ provided e ⇛ wp.INIT .ξ , (3)
which then assures that
e ⇛ wp.INIT .(wP.(It OpX ⊓ OpY tI).ξ ). (4)
The operational interpretation of (4) is that arbitrary interleaving of the operations OpX and OpY after
the initialisation INIT should always result in a distribution over the final states (of variables) such that
the expected value (with respect to invariant ξ ) is at least the initial value specified by the expression e.
Clearly, the conditions in (3) imply the operational interpretation of (4). However, if there is a particular
interleaving of the machine which demonstrates the failure of (4), then it must be true that (3) has hitherto
failed as well. The example below illustrates our argument.
2The complete framework encapsulates state variables and the operations on the states by the use of ‘clauses’.
3For random variables R, R′ , the implication-like relation R⇛ R′ means R is everywhere less than or equal to R′ .
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MACHINE Demon
SEES Int TYPE, Real TYPE
VARIABLES cc
INVARIANT cc : INT
EXPECTATIONS real(0) ⇛ cc
INITIALISATION cc := 0
OPERATIONS
nn ← OpX = BEGIN
PCHOICE f rac (1, 2) OF cc := cc+1
OR cc := cc−1 END || nn := cc
OpY = cc := 0
END
Figure 2: A pB model specified in the pAMN.
2.2.1 Example: A Simple Demonic Machine
Fig. 2 shows a pAMN (adapted from [14]) that captures the operations of a simple pB machine called
Demon, with a single variable cc; the INVARIANT clause specifies that cc must be Integer-valued —
pB’s prover always checks that this statement is true using the operational reasoning established in the
previous section. Initially, cc is set to 0; the OPERATIONS clause contains operations OpX and OpY.
OpX can either increment cc by 1 or decrement it by the same value both with probability 1/2, while OpY
just re-initialises cc to 0. The variable nn in the operation OpX is an output parameter which need not
occur in the VARIABLES clause4. The EXPECTATIONS clause specifies the expected value-invariant
ξ to be the random variable cc, and the initial expression e to be 0, so that “the expected value of cc over
any endpoint distribution is never decreased below 0” by the Demon’s OpX and OpY operations.
In this example, the machine fails to satisfy the probabilistic proof obligation specified in (4), and
the reason is that
(∃cc ∈ INT : ¬(cc ⇛ wp.OpY .cc)). (5)
The immediate expression captures the failure of the pB prover to establish the proof obligations in (3).
However, in terms of a distribution viewpoint, it is possible to see exactly why this failure of the pB
prover would similarly result in the failure of (4). Consider the program fragment
INIT ;OpX ;(OpY ⊳ (nn ≥ 0) ⊲ skip); (6)
it yields the distribution given by
δ =
{
cc := 0 @1/2
cc := −1 @1/2
over the final state of the random variable cc. Calculating the expected value over this distribution we get
∫
δ
cc = 1/2×0+1/2×−1 ≡−1/2,
which is clearly a violation of the conditions specified in the EXPECTATIONS clause.
In this simple case, it is clear that the failure to establish the pB proof obligation corresponds to
an exact result distribution over endpoints that demonstrates the failure. Currently pB provers do not
4It must however follow a similar machine declaration as cc to enable its PRISM transformation.
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provide diagnostic information necessary to give practitioners the much needed operational intuition (in
terms of distributions) for locating failures. This becomes even more complicated with increasing size
and complexity of the pB machines. For such cases, we simply rely on the model checking capabilities
of state-of-the-art tools like PRISM. To do this, we need to translate the pB machines to their equivalent
PRISM models, and use the latter’s algorithmic analysis to attempt to locate failures.
In the sections that follow, we show how the analysis of an equivalent PRISM representation of
a pB machine can provide a link between the operational viewpoints (distribution-centered) of both a
proof-based environment (encapsulating probabilistic invariants), and a model checking platform. Such
a link is key to getting a better understanding of the expected value-invariants over endpoint probabilistic
distributions.
3 PRISM Reward Specification
The PRISM model checker permits models to be augmented with information about rewards (or costs).
The tool can analyse properties which relate to the expected values of the rewards. A reward structure
[1] can be used to represent additional information about the system the MDP (the model types in this
paper) represents — for example, the expected number of packets sent (or lost) on a protocols request.
The temporal logic probabilistic CTL [12] has been extended in [2] to allow for reward-based spec-
ifications as constraints of the type that express reachability, cumulative and instantaneous rewards to
model checkers. However, for the purpose of this work, the instantaneous variant is useful.
Definition 8: (Expected instantaneous reward) The probabilistic CTL permits reward properties of
the form R∼r[I=k], at time-step k, where ∼∈ {<,≤,≥,>}, r ∈ R≥ and k ∈ N. The reward formula
R∼r[I=k]5is true if from some initial state s0, the expected state reward at time-step k meets the bound
∼ r. For example the specification R≥50[I=2] could be interpreted to mean that the expected number of
packets sent by the protocol after two time-steps is at least 50.
4 Quantitative Safety and pB Machines
Formal approaches necessitate that every safe system be invariant-driven [5]. Therefore, quantitative
safety properties can be proved by verifying invariants. The EXPECTATIONS clause of a pB machine
encapsulates the machine’s safety property. However, an interesting dimension in investigating pB safety
properties is whether it is possible to find a nondeterministic selection ⊓0≤n≤N Pn of the operations of the
machine that demonstrates the failure of the invariants — this schedule must then lead to the problem of
locating counterexamples for probabilistic model checking [6].
In [8] McIver et al. set out a strategy for computing a “refutation-of-safety” certificate for probabilis-
tic systems using model checking techniques. The existence of a certificate corresponds to an invariant
failure in our own context of safety. In the next section, we present an automation which demonstrates the
key features of that strategy and in particular show how it can be used to investigate pB safety properties.
The theorem below is fundamental for investigating safety properties specified for pB machines.
Theorem: Given a pB machine invariant ξ and initial expression e encapsulated in the machine’s EX-
PECTATIONS clause, let ∆ be the finite result distribution over endpoints for the interleaving It ⊓0≤n≤N Pn tI
after the machine’s initialisation INIT. A safe machine always guarantees that
e ⇛ wp.INIT .(wp.(It ⊓0≤n≤N Pn tI).ξ ) ⇒
∫
∆
ξ ≥ e, (7)
5For MDP’s we require Rmin or Rmax; this is allowed in PRISM by enabling the sparse engine in the tool’s options menu.
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provided the pB machine’s prover will always discharge the proof obligations given by e ⇛ wp.INIT .ξ
and ξ ⇛ wp.(It ⊓0≤n≤N Pn tI).ξ respectively.
Corollary: Suppose it is always possible to split the distribution ∆ into finite sub-distributions δk for all
k ≥ 0 where δk is the result distribution on the kth iteration, then
(∀k≥ 0∧δk ∈ ∆ :
∫
δk
ξ ≥ e) . (8)
The usefulness of the corollary is in the practical demonstration of the theorem. Its simplicity is captured
by the fact that, if a probabilistic computation tree which interprets the execution traces of the machine
is available to a verifier, then these traces must be finite with respect to the result distributions they
represent. Using bounded model checking techniques, it then suffices to argue that only finite values
of k are required to establish the proof obligation for a safe pB machine. More so, with state-of-the-art
probabilistic model checking tools such as PRISM, it is possible to identify a sub-space of the entire
distribution in which the failure is located (if any).
5 YAGA: A pAMN To PRISM Translator
In section 4, we stated a theorem that is central to defining safety features for pB machines with a
finite trace distribution over endpoints. The corollary of that theorem has the practical interpretation
that, bounded model checking techniques when equipped with reward structures are likely to provide an
intuition to locating invariant failures in their transformed proof-based models. In this section we discuss
a language-level translator nicknamed YAGA6 and with architectural framework shown in Fig. 3. YAGA,
a java-based implementation of the algorithm pAMN2PRISM (shown in Appendix A) is a prototype
system that essentially takes a pAMN framework, encapsulating a pB model (with syntactic checks
supposedly discharged) as its input parameter, and generates its precise probabilistic action systems
representation in the PRISM language. The associated reward structure of the generated PRISM model
is inherited from the pB machine’s EXPECTATIONS clause. The PRISM model checker then readily
offers its temporal logic specification (as probabilistic CTL formulas) which can easily be checked by
conducting experiments on the transformed model. The experimental results are sufficient to validate (or
refute) the probabilistic invariants specified in the abstract machine’s EXPECTATIONS clause.
5.1 Overview: YAGA Transformation Rules
We summarise the transformation rules as follows. YAGA’s algorithmic interpretation is in Appendix A.
5.1.1 Main Module
PRISM constants list: Are constructed from the pB machine’s parameter list (if any) and the CON-
STANTS clause. The type of a constant is implicitly checked from the PROPERTIES clause.
PRISM formula list: Are auto-generated as atomic predicates from the pB machine’s PROPERTIES
and INVARIANTS clauses.
PRISM module name: Is the pB machine’s name.
PRISM variables declaration and initial values list: Are constructed from each variable in the VARI-
ABLES clause, its type in the INVARIANT clause, and its initial values from the INITIALISATION
6The name YAGA is coined from an Igbo (a language largely spoken in southeastern Nigeria) word — YAGAzie, which
literally means “may it go well ...”. In reality, it could be argued that YAGA is simply Yet Another Gangling Automation.
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pAMN
INPUT pB MODEL OUTPUT VERIFIABLE PRISM FILE
TRANSFORMATION RULES PRISM
pB Value
 Objects
pB Client
PRISM Value 
Objects
PRISM Client
Figure 3: YAGA - Architectural Overview
clause. The lower and upper limits of the variables are respectively the default lowest values of their
types, and a bound specified from the PRISM constants list (above).
PRISM update statements: Each update statement is labeled with the operation’s name from the pB
machine. In addition,
(a) its guard is inherited from the guard in the pB machine’s OPERATIONS clause and strengthened
by the formulas in the PRISM formula list, such that
(b) the choice of a selection of formula is dependent on the expressions in the pB machine’s update
statement. For each update, YAGA checks that the formula-dependent expressions are included in
the PRISM guard.
5.1.2 Counter Module
The counter module is a vital encoding that helps enumerate the distributions in δk (in corollary) for
finite k steps. To capture this behaviour in a model checking environment, we apply the following rules.
PRISM module name: Counter.
PRISM variable declaration and initial value: Variable count is initially set to 0 and bounded by
(MAX COUNT +1).
PRISM update statement: Each update is constructed to synchronise with the updates in the main mod-
ule. They can only increment the count variable by 1 on each action. In addition, this module also contains
a similar unsynchronised update statement which ensures we will eventually reach (MAX COUNT +1).
5.1.3 Reward Structure
The specific reward structure is inherited from the pB machine’s EXPECTATIONS clause — states
where the count variable equals (MAX COUNT +1) are worth the random variable value specified in
the EXPECTATIONS clause plus (MAX COUNT)7.
However, to make the construction of our reward structures precise for model checking, we note
more formally as a result of the theorem in sec. 4 that
Remark 1: Given any pB machine invariant ξ and initial expression e, then from an initial state s0, after
the machine’s initialisation INIT, any arbitrary interleaving It ⊓0≤n≤N Pn tI must guarantee that:
(k :∈ [0,MAX COUNT +1] : e⇛ wp.INIT .(wp.(It ⊓0≤n≤N Pn tI).ξ )⇒ Rmin=?[I=k]≥ ξ .s0) (9)
7This padding is to ensure the PRISM engine is consistent with computing positive instantaneous rewards. Finally, we
subtract this parameter from the PRISM computed reward value.
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such that the expected minimum instantaneous reward at the kth step is worth the random variable value
of the EXPECTATIONS clause plus MAX COUNT. We recall that the Counter module keeps explicit
track of the kth time-step, and the expected value here is captured by the sub-distribution in (8).
Remark 2: However, if there exists some k such that (9) above fails to hold, then ξ cannot be an invariant.
6 Case Study: A Library Bookkeeping System
We present a pB machine which captures the basic operations underlying the accounting package of a
library system — the implication of an undischargeable proof obligation of the machine on the perfor-
mance of the library was an open problem in [14]. The state of the machine contains four variables:
booksInLibrary, loansStarted, loansEnded and booksLost which are respectively used to keep track of:
the number of books in the library, the number of book loans initiated by the library, the number of book
loans completed by the library, and the number of books possibly never returned to the library.
Initially, the machine has two operations: StartLoan, to initiate a loan on a book, and EndLoan, to
terminate the loan of a book. The StartLoan operation has a precondition that there are books available for
loan; it decrements booksInLibrary and increments loansStarted; when a book is returned, the EndLoan
operation reverses the effect of the StartLoan operation by recording that either the book “really is”
returned, or is actually reported lost with some probability pp, so that booksLost is incremented.
The machine uses the random variables loansEnded and booksLost to record the expected losses of
the number of books over time. Since with a probability pp a book is lost on each EndLoan operation,
the library system would then be expected to lose a proportion pp over a number of EndLoan operations.
However, to ensure that the library is always in the business of books lending, we define the expected
value-invariant ∫
∆
(pp× loansEnded−booksLost) ≥ 0, (10)
which captures the idea that the expected value of the random variable pp× loansEnded−booksLost
over its endpoint distributions ∆ can never be decreased below 0. This is indeed a safety property for the
library and ought to be checked throughout its lifetime to ensure it is not violated by its future designs.
Below, we present two designs of the library and also keep in mind the property specified in (10).
6.1 A Safe Library Bookkeeping System
Since there are no restrictions on when the operations of the machine can be invoked, except for the
obvious preconditions on StartLoan and EndLoan; the specification of a safe library system is the non-
deterministic choice given by
Sa f eLibrary , It StartLoan ⊓ Endloan tI . (11)
6.2 An Unsafe Library Bookkeeping System
Suppose that to enable the library accountant do a periodic stock take of the library transactions, a new
operation called StockTake is introduced into the system. The StockTake operation is very similar to the
initialisation, except for an extra output (totalCost) to record the cost of replacing the books lost up to
the time of doing a stock take. Again, we augment (11) and give another specification of the library as
Unsa f eLibrary , It StartLoan ⊓ Endloan ⊓ StockTake tI . (12)
The complete pB machine describing the library (all of its three operations) is shown in Appendix A.
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Figure 4: Library Bookkeeping System
7 PRISM Experimental Results
In this section we report experimental results that are indeed performance-style characterisations of the
two designs of our library model — the safe library (11) and the unsafe library (12). Our interest lies in
justifying the reason why one design of the library (without stockTake) is safe and why the other (with
stockTake) is unsafe. We note that our safety property of concern is captured by (10).
To enable us carry out this performance analysis, we quickly use the capabilities of YAGA. The
equivalent PRISM representation of the pB machine discussed in the previous section as generated by
YAGA is shown in Appendix A. From Remark 1, our obvious reward specification becomes
(∀ 0≤ k ≤MAX COUNT : Rmin=?[I=k]−MAX COUNT) . (13)
The requirement for a safe library system is that for all time-steps k, Rmin is never decrease below zero.
However, our experimental result (shown in Fig. 4) reveals that indeed the unsafe library violates this
safety property after just three time-steps (k = 3) of its execution — that is for MAX COUNT = 2,
pp = 0.5, and totalBooks = 1, the expected minimum instantaneous reward Rmin of the unsafe library
is -0.25.
A quick conclusion that can be drawn from our analysis is that introducing the “demonic” StockTake
operation has the adverse effect of subverting the overall performance outlook of the library system. Our
result is a practical demonstration of the claim by Hoang T.S. et al. [14] in an attempt to explain why the
presence of the StockTake operation would result in a failure of the proof obligation for the probabilistic
invariant property in (10). In the proof-based system, reaching this conclusion was practically impossible.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper has explored the practical application of reward-based specifications of bounded model check-
ing techniques [4] to locate failures in the context of proof-based verification for simple safety properties
of probabilistic systems. We demonstrated the rich benefits that can be derived by complementing proof-
based probabilistic verification techniques with a model checking performance-style evaluation, in a
manner that has never been previously explored.
Our contribution is seen as a first attempt at fully integrating quantitative performance analysis to
systems design at early stages of development. Our method scales in this regard since it can be carried
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out at the level of source code and hence can guide system developers with decisions on a choice of
design most suitable for implementation.
However, in other to fully integrate this performance-style analysis into software development pro-
cess, we intend to, in the future, incorporate a diagnostic mechanism based on counterexamples location
employed in [6, 17] to YAGA. Our intention is that such a mechanism will report explicit cause(s) of fail-
ure by also exploring the backward analysis strategy in [8]. It is our belief that these enhancements would
provide a useful performance analysis suite for probabilistic systems developed in the pB language.
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Appendix A
MACHINE ProbabilisticLibrary (totalBooks, cost)
SEES Real type
CONSTANTS pp
PROPERTIES pp ∈ REAL ∧ pp≤ real (1) ∧ real (0)≤ pp
VARIABLES booksInLibrary, loansStarted, loansEnded, booksLost, totalCost
INVARIANT booksInLibrray, loansStarted, loansEnded, booksLost, totalCost ∈ NATURAL ∧ loansEnded ≤ loansStarted
∧ booksInLibrary + booksLost + loansStarted - loansEnded = totalBooks
EXPECTATIONS real (0)⇛ pp× real (loansEnded)− real(booksLost)
INITIALISATION booksInLibrary, loansStarted, loansEnded, booksLost, totalCost := totalBooks, 0, 0, 0, 0
OPERATIONS StartLoan = PRE booksInLibrary > 0 THEN
booksInLibrary := booksInLibrary - 1 || loansStarted := loansStarted + 1 END;
EndLoan = PRE loansEnded < loansStarted THEN
PCHOICE pp OF booksLost := booksLost + 1
OR booksInLibrary := booksInLibrary + 1 END || loansEnded : = loansEnded + 1 END;
StockTake = BEGIN totalCost := cost × booksLost || booksInLibrary := booksInLibrary + booksLost ||
loansStarted := loansStarted - loansEnded || loansEnded := 0 || booksLost := 0 END
END
Figure 5: The pB Model of Section (6)
const totalBooks;
const cost;
const double pp;
const MAX COUNT;
formula formula0 = (loansEnded ≤ loansStarted);
formula formula1 = (booksInLibrary + booksLost + loansStarted - loansEnded = totalBooks);
formula formula2 = (pp ≤ 1);
formula formula3 = (0 ≤ pp);
module ProbabilisticLibrary
booksLost:[0..totalBooks] init 0;
totalCost:[0..totalBooks] init 0;
loansEnded:[0..totalBooks] init 0;
loansStarted:[0..totalBooks] init 0;
booksInLibrary:[0..totalBooks] init totalBooks;
[StockTake] formula1 & formula0 → (totalCost ′ = cost * booksLost) & (booksInLibrary ′ = booksInLibrary + booksLost)
& (loansStarted ′ = loansStarted - loansEnded) & (loansEnded ′ = 0) & (booksLost ′ = 0);
[StartLoan] (booksInLibrary > 0) & formula1 & formula0 & (loansStarted + 1 ≤ totalBooks) →
(booksInLibrary ′ = booksInLibrary - 1) & (loansStarted ′ = loansStarted + 1);
[EndLoan] (loansEnded < loansStarted) & formula2 & formula1 & formula3 & formula0 →
pp: (booksLost ′ = booksLost + 1) & (loansEnded ′ = loansEnded + 1)
+ (1 - pp): (booksInLibrary ′ = booksInLibrary + 1) & (loansEnded ′ = loansEnded + 1);
endmodule
label “expectations” = (pp * loansEnded - booksLost ≥ 0);
module Counter
count:[0..MAX COUNT + 1] init 0;
[StockTake] (count + 1 ≤ MAX COUNT + 1) → (count ′ = count + 1);
[StartLoan] (count + 1 ≤ MAX COUNT + 1) → (count ′ = count + 1);
[EndLoan] (count + 1 ≤ MAX COUNT + 1) → (count ′ = count + 1);
[] (count + 1 ≤ MAX COUNT + 1) → (count ′ = count + 1);
endmodule
rewards
(count = MAX COUNT + 1) : (pp * loansEnded - booksLost) + MAX COUNT;
endrewards
Figure 6: A YAGA-Generated PRISM Representation of Fig. (5)
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Algorithm pAMN2PRISM (pB model in pAMN)
Required: An interface for pB syntax, PRISM syntax, and regular math operators.
Reserved: MAX COUNT (constant), count (variable)
1: get pAMN parameter list if any
2: create a map object with pAMN clauses as the the keys. Insert their respective values
3: construct value objects with (1) and (2)
4: set module type as MDP
5: construct PRISM constants list from the pAMN parameter list and PROPERTIES key
6: construct PRISM formula list as atomic predicates from the INVARIANT and
PROPERTIES keys
7: get PRISM module name from MACHINE key (declare module name)
8: construct PRISM variables list and their initial values from the VARIABLES
and INVARIANT keys and the pAMN parameter list (if any)
9: for the OPERATIONS key in the map object do
get the list of operations
for each operation in the list do
for each guard and update statement in operation do
check variables dependency on (6)
10: construct PRISM update statements with the pAMN operations names as the
action labels
11: declare endmodule
12: construct expectations label from the EXPECTATIONS key in map object
13: declare module counter
14: declare count variable, initialised to zero and bounded by MAX COUNT + 1
15: for the OPERATIONS key in the map object do
get the list of operations
for each operation in the list do
construct a synchronised update statement (increment) on the count
variable with (10)
16: construct an unsynchronised update statement on the count variable
17: declare endmodule
18: declare PRISM rewards
19: for states where (count = MAX COUNT + 1)
20: set reward to random variable value on EXPECTATIONS key plus MAX COUNT
21: declare endrewards
Figure 7: An Algorithmic Description of YAGA
